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INTRODUCTION
It is a pleasure and a privilege to comment on Larry Kramer's 2002
Jorde Lecture. Beautifully crafted, deeply erudite, sharply original, and
resonant with passionate conviction, the Lecture addresses a topic of grow-
ing significance to contemporary constitutional thought. Together with the
book from which it is drawn,1 the Lecture will no doubt prove a major con-
tribution to our understanding of American constitutional history. Time
spent reflecting on Kramer's project is time well spent.
Kramer argues for "popular constitutionalism," by which he means a
system in which the people assume "active and ongoing control over the
interpretation and enforcement of constitutional law."2 Kramer identifies
the enemy of popular constitutionalism as "judicial supremacy," by which
he means "the notion that judges have the last word when it comes to con-
stitutional interpretation and that their decisions determine the meaning of
the Constitution for everyone."3 Kramer argues for a world in which courts
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I. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (forthcoming 2004).
2. Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 959 (2004).
3. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 125. This represents a more far-reaching position than that taken in
Kramer's 2001 Harvard Foreword, which is the origin of his book. In his original Foreword Kramer
had argued:
There is... a world of difference between having the last word and having the only
word: between judicial supremacy and judicial sovereignty. We may choose to accept
judicial supremacy, because we need someone to settle certain constitutional questions and,
for a variety of historical and jurisprudential reasons, the Supreme Court seems like our best
option. But it does not follow either that the Court must wield its authority over every
question or that, when it does, the Court can dismiss or too quickly supplant the views of
other, more democratic institutions. Nothing in the doctrine of judicial supremacy, in other
words, requires denying either that the Constitution has qualities that set it apart from
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"see themselves in relation to the public somewhat as lower court judges
now see themselves in relation to the Court: responsible for interpreting
the Constitution according to their best judgment, but with an awareness
that there is a higher authority out there with power to overturn their
decisions-an actual authority, too, not some abstract 'people' who spoke
once, two hundred years ago, and then disappeared."4
Kramer insists that we face a "choice between popular
constitutionalism and judicial supremacy."5 He argues that popular consti-
tutionalism has predominated throughout most of our history, but that since
the 1980s judicial supremacy seems to have "become the norm,"6 em-
braced by both the left and the right because of the "profoundly
antidemocratic attitudes"7 that underlie each.8 Kramer regards contempo-
rary "supporters of judicial supremacy" as "today's aristocrats,"9 who em-
body a kind of "High Federalism redux"'" that dismisses "democratic
politics as scary and threatening"' 1 and that holds "deep-seated misgivings
about ordinary citizens."' 2
These are powerful indictments. They express an urgent belief that the
meaning of the American Constitution should be bound to the beliefs of the
ordinary law, or that these qualities confer legitimate interpretive authority on political actors
as a means of ensuring continued popular input in shaping constitutional meaning.
The trick, of course, is to find the proper balance, a problem courts have
struggled with throughout American history.
Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13
(2001). Whereas in his Foreword Kramer had objected to the Court having "the only word" concerning
constitutional meaning, in his present work Kramer also objects to the Court having the "last" word.
See KRAMER, supra note 1, at 208: "Bear in mind that popular constitutionalism never denied courts
the power of judicial review: it denied only that judges had final say." Kramer's present work thus
stakes out a far more radical and provocative position than did his Foreword.
4. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 253.
5. Kramer, supra note 2, at l 11.
6. Kramer, supra note 2, at 964; see also Kramer, supra note 2, at 963-64 (internal citation
omitted).
Once the Warren Court was in full swing, focus shifted almost entirely to the judiciary.
Conservatives argued that the Court's decisions were wrong, while liberals defended its
interpretive methods and outcomes. An idea of popular constitutionalism, of "the people"
bridging the divide between law and politics by acting as authoritative interpreters of a
constitutional text, was no longer a meaningful part of the intellectual universe. The principle
of judicial supremacy came to monopolize constitutional theory and discourse, a monopoly
that thrived during the tenure of Chief Justice Burger and persisted into the early years of the
Rehnquist Court.
We note that although the Warren Court did articulate a broad rationale for judicial supremacy in
decisions like Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), it also was prepared generously to support the
expression of popular constitutionalism in decisions like Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
For a full discussion, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the
People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 34-38 (2003).
7. Kramer, supra note 2, at 1003.
8. Kramer, supra note 2, at 1003-04.
9. Kramer, supra note 2, at 1008.
10. Kramer, supra note 2, at 1003.
11. Kramer, supra note 2, at 1003.
12. Kramer, supra note 2, at 1005.
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American people. Kramer is concerned that Americans-on the Court and
across the nation-have lost sight of the important role that popular con-
viction plays in constitutional interpretation. A juricentric Constitution
leads to judicial overreaching and citizen passivity, which together threaten
important features of our constitutional culture. We agree with Kramer that
constitutional law must in the end find its legitimacy in the constitutional
culture of nonjudicial actors.'" But because we nonetheless see a more sig-
nificant role for the institution of judicial review in realizing constitutional
values than does Kramer, we shall use the occasion of this Reply to explore
and clarify some divergences and convergences in our views.
In contrast to Kramer, we do not understand judicial supremacy and
popular constitutionalism to be mutually exclusive systems of constitu-
tional ordering. Kramer defines judicial supremacy as resting on the con-
cept of judicial finality.' 4 Yet some forms of judicial finality are essential
to the rule of law, which is necessary for a functioning democracy. For this
reason both judicial supremacy and popular constitutionalism each con-
tribute indispensable benefits to the American constitutional polity.15 They
are in fact dialectically interconnected and have long coexisted.
As Kramer models the problem, judicial supremacy and popular con-
stitutionalism are distinct and competing forms of constitutional ordering;
the nation must choose whether to institutionalize one or the other. Either
the people or the Court must have the last word, and Kramer chooses the
people. Although we agree with Kramer that there can be deep tension be-
tween judicial supremacy and popular constitutionalism, there are also vital
interdependencies between judicial supremacy and popular constitutional-
ism that Kramer fails to appreciate. 6 The question we pursue, therefore, is
how the nation can strike a viable balance between the rule of law and the
people's authority to speak to issues of constitutional meaning.
13. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword. Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003); Robert C. Post & Reva B.
Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family
and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination
and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004);
Reva B. Siegel, Text in Context: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001).
14. See Kramer, supra note 3.
15. See Post & Siegel, supra note 6.
16. Cf Siegel, Text in Context, supra note 13, at 350-51:
The fact that elected officials and ordinary citizens are making multiple and conflicting
claims about the Constitution's meaning need not be a threat to the Court's authority and, in
our democratic constitutional culture, may well be a necessary condition of it....
A look at our constitutional history suggests that judicial supremacy is, in important
respects, a collaborative practice, involving the Court in partnerships with the representative
branches and the People themselves.
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I
THE MEANING OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
To analyze the relationship between popular constitutionalism and
judicial supremacy we must first clarify what is at stake in the concept of
judicial supremacy. We can exclude some accounts of judicial supremacy
as implausible. No one believes, for example, that the Court is authorized
to "determine the meaning of the Constitution" by prohibiting beliefs about
the Constitution that differ from the Court's own view. It is intelligible and
commonplace for citizens to believe that the Court has mistakenly inter-
preted the Constitution, and no one committed to judicial supremacy would
seek to deny or alter this. The concept of judicial supremacy, therefore,
does not mean that courts are empowered to determine citizens' beliefs
about the Constitution.
Nor does the concept of judicial supremacy authorize courts to pre-
vent citizens from attempting to endow their constitutional beliefs with
legal authority. If a citizen believes that the Court has misinterpreted the
Constitution, it is perfectly proper for the citizen to act on that belief by
advancing a constitutional amendment to overrule the Court's judgment. 7
This point is a deep one, for it suggests that no one would accept any ver-
sion of judicial supremacy that would prevent citizens from acting to alter
the meaning of the Constitution through a variety of mechanisms that have
in the past proved exceedingly effective. It has been argued, for example,
that "[p]artisan entrenchment through presidential appointments to the
judiciary is the best account of how the meaning of the Constitution
changes over time through Article III interpretation rather than through
Article V amendment."' 8 No plausible version of judicial supremacy would
prevent citizens from voting for a President because they believe he will
appoint Supreme Court Justices who will express the citizens' own view of
the Constitution, even if that view differs from the decided opinions of the
Court.
Because Article III lodges the composition of the federal judiciary in
the political control of the President and the Senate, no judicial interpreta-
tion of the Constitution can withstand the mobilized, enduring, and deter-
mined opposition of the people. Even Justice Antonin Scalia concedes that
"the appointment and confirmation process will" ensure the ultimate
17. Not even Kramer believes that judicial supremacy is inconsistent with the amendment
process. See KRAMER, supra note 1, at 52-53. In his view, popular constitutionalism requires that the
people be given responsibility "not only for making, but also for interpreting and enforcing their
constitutions." Id. at 53. Kramer speaks of supporters of judicial supremacy as "those who favored
giving courts final say over the Constitution 'this side of an amendment.'" Id. at 208.
18. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L.
REV. 1045, 1068 (2001).
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influence of popular opinion.' 9 To the extent that the design of Article III
ensures that the people retain the final word on the meaning of their
Constitution, it guarantees the structural priority of a certain form of popu-
lar constitutionalism.20 In view of these features of our constitutional order,
it is unhelpful to define judicial supremacy as giving to courts the last word
or ultimate authority to determine constitutional meaning.2
II
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND DEPARTMENTALISM
If no plausible account of judicial supremacy deprives citizens of ul-
timate control over the meaning of the Constitution, why then does Kramer
believe that judicial supremacy threatens popular constitutionalism? A pos-
sible answer is that Kramer understands judicial supremacy to undermine
the authority of the people's representatives to determine the content of the
Constitution.
In offering a history of popular constitutionalism, Kramer conceives
elections as "critical moments for expressing the people's active, ongoing
sovereignty."22 Elections authorize Congress and the President to speak for
the people. If Congress and the President are equated in this way with
popular sovereignty, popular constitutionalism can be understood to entail
a stringent form of departmentalism,23 which is the view that each of the
three branches of the federal government possesses independent and co-
ordinate authority to interpret the Constitution.
Kramer emphasizes this implication of popular constitutionalism
throughout his book.2 4 He equates popular constitutionalism with the de-
partmentalist premise that "as an authority, [the Supreme Court] does not
19. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 47
(1997). For a discussion, see Post and Siegel, supra note 6, at 25.
20. Robert C. Post, Sustaining the Premise of Legality: Learning to Live with Bush v. Gore, in
BUSH v. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 96, 102 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002):
By choosing a president, Americans nationally come as close as they can to fulfilling
Arendt's account of the political: they insert themselves, by word and deed, into the world,
in an effort to construct a common identity and to begin something entirely new. By
specifying that the president shall appoint justices, rather than the reverse, the Constitution
signifies that the political choice collectively made by the American people should inform the
Court's vision of law.
21. Thus Kramer asks whether we are "prepared to insist on our right to control the meaning of
the Constitution." Kramer, supra note 2, at 1009 (emphasis added).
22. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 197.
23. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 201.
24. See KRAMER, supra note 1, at 114 (explaining "how popular constitutionalism had evolved
and how its essence was preserved by the departmental theory"); id. at 201 ("Van Buren and the
Democrats were not opposed to judicial review. Rather, like Jefferson before them, it was judicial
supremacy they opposed-believing instead in a departmental theory grounded in popular
constitutionalism."); id. at 252 (referring to "the choice between a system of judicial supremacy and
one based on departmental or coordinate construction").
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bind either the Congress or the President of the United States."25 Because
both the President and the Congress are agents of the people's will, popular
control of constitutional meaning demands that Congress and the President
must be free to make and act on their own interpretations of the
Constitution. It follows that judicial decisions can be neither final nor de-
finitive. Thus Kramer writes that popular constitutionalism would establish
a departmentalist world in which:
Each branch could express its views as issues came before it in the
ordinary course of business: the legislature by enacting laws, the
executive by vetoing them, the judiciary by reviewing them. But
none of the branches' views were final or authoritative. They were
the actions of regulated entities striving to follow the law that
governed them, subject to ongoing supervision by their common
superior, the people themselves.26
Kramer observes that what is "at stake in the choice between a system of
judicial supremacy and one based on departmental or coordinate
construction" is precisely that "[i]n the latter system, the authority of
judicial decisions formally and explicitly depends on reactions from the
other branches and, through them, from the public." 7
Viewed from this angle, popular constitutionalism can entail extraor-
dinarily controversial consequences. By interpreting departmentalism in
light of the values of popular constitutionalism, Kramer takes departmenta-
lism to conclusions with which many departmentalists would disagree.
Most theorists of departmentalism situate their analysis in the context of
separation of powers, rather than popular constitutionalism."5 They frame
25. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 201 (quoting MARTIN VAN BUREN, INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN
AND COURSE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 329-30 (1867) (quoting Senator Hugh
Lawson White)). Van Buren (quoting White), goes on to observe:
If different interpretations are put upon the Constitution by the different departments, the
people is the tribunal to settle the dispute. Each of the departments is the agent of the people,
doing their business according to the powers conferred; and where there is a disagreement as
to the extent of these powers, the people themselves, though the ballot-boxes, must settle it.
KRAMER, supra note 1, at 201. Van Buren's understanding of how elections can settle questions of
constitutional meaning is somewhat unclear. It is unlikely that Van Buren was referring to what Teddy
Roosevelt would later propose, which is the recall of judicial decisions. See KRAMER, supra note 1, at
216. Presumably Van Buren was referring to the fact that by elections citizens could elect presidents
and legislators who would oppose judicial decisions of which they disapproved, or who would appoint
Justices who would interpret the Constitution in the proper manner.
26. KRAMER, supra note ], at 109.
27. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 252.
28. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to Professor
Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347, 348 (1994) (advocating a system of "comparative institutional competence,
pursuant to which each institution must interpret the Constitution in order to decide how much
deference to give to specific decisions by other institutions") (emphasis omitted); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217,
225-26 (1994) (arguing for departmentalism on the grounds that the Founders believed not in judicial
supremacy but in "separated and shared powers distributed among coequal, coordinate branches"). But
cf SUSAN R. BURGESS, CONTEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: THE ABORTION & WAR POWERS
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their work by asking how the constitutionally assigned functions and dis-
tinctive interpretive capacities of the three branches of the federal govern-
ment should be coordinated.29 Because the Constitution allocates the
"judicial Power" to Article III courts, and because that power is commonly
understood to entail that judicial interpretations be definitive with respect
to the parties in a case,30 "[t]here is widespread agreement that the
executive has a legal duty to enforce valid final judgments rendered by
courts, regardless of whether the executive agrees with the legal analysis
that forms the basis for the judgment."'" It is not clear, however, how this
position can be sustained if departmentalism is informed by a popular
DEBATES 13-19 (1992) (identifying enhanced public debate about constitutional meaning as a benefit of
departmental ism).
29. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Institutions and the Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 1529, 1586-89 (2000) (criticizing departmentalism as advanced by Paulsen and instead
proposing a "preference for rights" approach, under which the rule set by the branch that protects the
most liberty would serve as the governing rule for all branches); Eisgruber, supra note 28, 349-53
(arguing that interpretive authority belongs to the most competent branch or branches); Geoffrey P.
Miller, The President's Power of Interpretation: Implications of a Unified Theory of Constitutional
Law, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROaS. 35, 51-61 (1993) (enumerating specific contexts in which the
President may interpret the Constitution as opposed to those circumstances when the President must
defer to the courts or the legislature).
30. Most scholars have expressed the view that "'the judicial Power' means the power to decide
cases with finality, so that judgments must by their nature bind the executive (and Congress) to
enforcement." Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1314 (1996) (emphasis omitted); see also Gary Lawson, The
Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 30 (1994). The major
exception seems to be Michael Stokes Paulsen. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and
the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 84, 88-99
(1993); Paulsen, supra note 28. For qualifications even within Paulsen's position, see Paulsen, supra
note 28, at 288-92. For a recent contretemps involving judicial finality in the context of state courts, see
Adam Liptak, In Florida Right-to-Die Case, Legislation That Puts the Constitution at Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, at A20 ("'The [Florida] statute tells the governor that he does not have to enforce
judicial decisions,' [Professor Steven G. Gey] said. 'That's sort of George Wallace territory."').
31. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments,
15 CARDOzo L. REV. 43, 46 (1993); see also, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Caesarism, Departmentalism,
and Professor Paulsen, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1425 (1999); Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential
Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 905 (1990); Lawson & Moore, supra note 30, at 1313-14
("With the notable exception of Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen, every modern departmentalist
scholar has maintained that the President has an obligation to enforce specific judgments rendered by
federal courts, even when the President believes that the judgments rest on erroneous constitutional
reasoning.") (internal citations omitted).
Departmentalists debate "whether the executive is bound not only by final judicial judgments, but
also by the exposition of law contained in judicial opinions." Merrill, supra, at 47. Thomas Merrill
notes a shift in this debate that somewhat parallels Kramer's observation of the recent triumph of
judicial supremacy:
Until fairly recently, the conventional wisdom in the legal academy appeared to be that
statements of law in judicial opinions are binding only on the parties to the judgment under
the rules of res judicata and on the courts themselves under principles of stare decisis. In the
last two decades, however, a silent shift seems to have taken place, to the point where many
commentators (and most judges) presuppose the opposite view: that judicial understandings
of law are directly binding on executive actors.
Merrill, supra, at 49-50 (internal citation omitted).
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constitutionalism that is primarily concerned to ensure that the people re-
tain the last word in questions of constitutional meaning.
We can better appreciate the potentially radical implications of
Kramer's fusion of departmentalism and popular constitutionalism if we
imagine a scenario in which Congress passes a "Sedition Law" penalizing
support for terrorism. Assume that a citizen is convicted and imprisoned
for violating the Sedition Law, and that the Court rules that the Sedition
Law is unconstitutional because it violates the First Amendment. Does
popular constitutionalism require us to believe that the President, as an
agent of the people's sovereign will, can properly refuse to release the citi-
zen from prison because the President interprets the First Amendment dif-
ferently than the Court?
The question poses something of a dilemma for Kramer. If he affirms
that the Court's decision is not final, and that the President is therefore not
obliged to enforce it, he has effectively undermined the institution of judi-
cially enforceable constitutional rights. But if Kramer believes that the
Court's judgment must be obeyed, he has acknowledged that the Court's
interpretation of the Constitution should remain final and definitive with
respect to the parties in a case. As Kramer has framed the problem, he has
sustained judicial supremacy by subordinating the people's understanding
of the Constitution to the Court's.
III
THE CONSTITUTION AS LAW
The hypothetical scenario of the Sedition Law brings us face-to-face
with the question of whether popular constitutionalism is consistent with
judicial enforcement of constitutional rights. In Kramer's model, where
popular constitutionalism and judicial supremacy are agonists, where either
the people or the Court has the last word, the nation must choose either to
assert popular control over the Constitution's meaning or to endow consti-
tutional rights with the attributes of ordinary law. In our view of the ques-
tion, however, this is a false dichotomy.
The concept of constitutional rights is at least in part rooted in protec-
tions accorded to private law rights, the ordinary legal entitlements that
citizens assert against one another. Because modern societies have desig-
nated courts as the primary institution to settle private disputes, private le-
gal rights are commonly understood to be final and definitive vis-A-vis
other branches of government. This requirement of finality is so entrenched
that it is incorporated into the Court's very definition of the "judicial
Power" established by Article Ill.32 Although constitutional rights may
32. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) ("[C]ongress cannot vest
review of the decisions of Article Ill courts in officials of the Executive Branch"); Chicago & S. Air
Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1948) ("Judgments within the powers vested in
1034 [Vol. 92:1027
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serve different ends than ordinary legal entitlements, we nonetheless expect
constitutional rights to be judicially enforceable to the same extent as are
ordinary legal entitlements.33
There are a variety of distinct reasons why a society might believe that
constitutional rights should have the properties of ordinary legal entitle-
ments, and many of these reasons are rooted in values and commitments
quite distinct from the "profoundly antidemocratic attitudes" of which
Kramer complains.3 4 Constitutional rights might have the properties of or-
dinary legal entitlements because the values protected by such rights are
deemed of transcendent importance, like the protection of persons from
torture. A constitutional commitment to such values need not express a
global "strategy of precommitment"35 ; nor need it depend upon the idea
that courts are the only "forum of principle" that can accurately apprehend
constitutional values36 ; nor need it rest on the belief that courts are neces-
sary to exercise a "settlement function" that will preserve the country from
social anarchy.37 Instead, support for judicial finality in the protection of
constitutional rights may reflect the simple idea that in certain contexts we
want citizens to hold rights against their government that are as secure and
as reliable as the private rights that they hold against their fellow citizens.
Constitutional rights need not be inimical to democracy. There is a
long tradition of theorizing the many ways in which constitutional rights
courts by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution may not lawfully be revised, overturned or refused
faith and credit by another Department of Government.... It has also been the firm and unvarying
practice of Constitutional Courts to render no judgments not binding and conclusive on the parties and
none that are subject to later review or alteration by administrative action."); United States v. Ferreira,
54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1851) (denying jurisdiction because the secretary of treasury could refuse to pay
claims under a treaty if they were deemed to not be just and equitable); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 408, 410 n.t (1792) ("[B]y the constitution, neither the Secretary at War, nor any other Executive
officer, nor even the Legislature, are authorized to sit as a court of errors on the judicial acts or opinions
of this court."); THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 484 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("A
legislature, without exceeding its province, cannot reverse a determination once made in a particular
case; though it may prescribe a new rule for future cases."); I HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 298 (1891) (emphasis omitted):
The power to open or vacate judgments is essentially judicial. Therefore, on the great
constitutional principle of the separation of the powers and functions of the three departments
of government, it cannot be exercised by the legislature. While a statute may indeed declare
what judgments shall in future be subject to be vacated, or when or how or for what causes, it
cannot apply retrospectively to judgment already rendered and which had become final and
unalterable by the court before its passage. Such an act would be unconstitutional and void on
two grounds; first, because it would unlawfully impair the fixed and vested rights of the
successful litigant; and second, because it would be an unwarranted invasion of the province
of the judicial department.
33. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY
AND POLITICS 207 (2002).
34. Kramer, supra note 2, at 1003.
35. Kramer, supra note 2, at 986.
36. Kramer, supra note 2, at 992.
37. Kramer, supra note 2, at 962; see also Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, I 10 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1371-72 (1997).
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can be democracy enhancing.38 Constitutional rights may instantiate the
very values that democracy seeks to establish, and they may also be neces-
sary to the discursive formation of popular will upon which democracy is
based. Popular constitutionalism and judicial supremacy are mutually ex-
clusive only if we imagine that democracy is at root about brute forms of
preference aggregation, of the kind that underlie some crude justifications
of majoritarianism. But if democracy is instead about the realization of the
complex substantive value of collective self-governance,39 we must attend
to the conditions under which individuals participate in the discursive for-
mation of popular will. Citizens may require secure and stable entitlements
against forms of censorship or other exercises of state power that disrupt or
otherwise undermine public discourse.4" No doubt any particular entitle-
ment can be controversial and even antidemocratic, but it does not seem
plausible to condemn all support for such rights as either aristocratic or
"High Federalism redux." A commitment to these rights can instead reflect
genuine concern for democracy itself.
This suggests that in some circumstances popular constitutionalism
may actually require constitutional rights for its realization. That is perhaps
why popular constitutionalism has historically coexisted so comfortably
with support for the kind of judicial finality entailed by constitutional
rights. Americans have generally been committed both to judicially en-
forceable constitutional rights and to the idea that the Constitution reflects
the political self-conception of the nation.41 They have understood that ju-
dicially enforceable rights play an important role in guaranteeing the
38. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980); FRANK 1. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY (1999); Frank I. Michelman,
Brennan and Democracy, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 399 (1998); Robert C. Post, Between Democracy and
Community: The Legal Constitution of Social Form, in DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY: NOMOS
XXXV 163, 168-69 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993); Robert C. Post, Community and the
First Amendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473, 476-78 (1997); Robert Post, Meiklejohn's
Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1134
(1993).
39. On the distinction, see Robert Post, Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Judicial Review,
86 CALIF. L. REV. 429 (1998); and Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517 (1997).
40. See Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 267 (1990).
41. Andrew Jackson, for example, could both support popular constitutionalism and also remark
to his nephew that "all the rights secured to the citizens under the constitution [are] worth nothing, and
a mere buble [sic], except guaranteed to them by an independant [sic] and virtuous Judiciary." Letter
from Andrew Jackson to Andrew J. Donelson (July 5, 1822), in 3 CORRESPONDENCE OF ANDREW
JACKSON 167 (John Spencer Bassett ed., 1928). Citing a letter from Roger Taney to Martin Van Buren,
Charles Warren concluded that Jackson's departmentalism "never asserted a right to decline to carry
out a Court decision, when acting in his Executive capacity. It was when exercising his part of the law-
making function of the Nation, and when deciding upon signature or veto of a bill presented to him,
that he claimed the privilege of determining for himself the constitutionality of the proposed measure."
I CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 762-63 (F.B. Rothman 1987)
(1926).
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conditions of popular constitutionalism, and that popular constitutionalism
plays an important role in articulating the fundamental values that judi-
cially enforceable rights function to instantiate.
Kramer is correct, however, to emphasize that the relationship be-
tween popular constitutionalism and judicially enforceable rights is satu-
rated with tension and conflict. Judicially enforceable rights circumscribe
the domain of collective self-governance, as Americans protesting
Lochner,4" Brown,43 and Roe" have passionately reminded us. And accul-
turated deference to judicial authority may sap the nation of the sense of
entitlement, responsibility, and urgent normative engagement that is neces-
sary for the exercise of constitutional self-governance. The question is how
this tension between popular constitutionalism and constitutional rights
should inform our understanding of judicial supremacy. Exploring this
question will clarify the grounds on which we diverge from, and ultimately
converge with, Kramer.
IV
THE CONSTITUTION AND ORDINARY LAW45
For Kramer, the tension between constitutional rights and popular
constitutionalism is played out in the frontier that separates the Constitu-
tion conceived "as hard law, law written virtually in capital letters (LAW),
law as meaning reliable law, '46 from the Constitution conceived as the re-
pository of our "fundamental nature as a people" that "is sacred and
demands our respectful acknowledgement." 7 Kramer conceptualizes this
frontier as lying between the Constitution understood as "ordinary law," as
the "kind of law normally managed through litigation and judicial
interpretation,"48 and the Constitution understood as "fundamental law, '49
42. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
43. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
44. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
45. "There is an unfortunate tendency.., to confuse constitutional law with the Constitution."
Edwin Meese 111, Taking Exception, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1986, at A20.
46. William W. Van Alstyne, The Idea of the Constitution as Hard Law, 37 J. LEGAL EDuc. 174,
179 (1987). Van Alstyne writes that the Constitution as law is "[b]y far the most important idea of the
Constitution." Id.
47. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 167, 169 (1987).
Pitkin writes that although our Constitution is something that we can make, "how we are able to
constitute ourselves is profoundly tied to how we are already constituted by our own distinctive
history." Id. at 169. "Thus," she concludes, "there is a sense... in which our constitution is sacred and
demands our respectful acknowledgement. If we mistake who we are, our efforts at constitutive action
will fail." Id.
48. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 155.
49. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 62.
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as a form of "political-legal"5 judgment that is "not like ordinary law at
all.""' In the ensuing discussion, we shall refer to the first aspect of the
Constitution as "constitutional law," and to the second simply as "the
Constitution." In this nomenclature, "constitutional law" reflects the judg-
ments and opinions of courts, whereas the "Constitution" expresses the
fundamental beliefs of "We the People."
Because we believe that "the rule of law implicitly depends upon an-
tecedent political commitments and understandings," 2 we agree with
Kramer that the Constitution is analytically and sociologically prior to con-
stitutional law. But because we also believe that the relationship between
the Constitution and constitutional law is dialectical, not unidirectional, we
disagree with Kramer's conclusion that popular constitutionalism requires
the radical disestablishment of judicial supremacy. We regard the tension
between popular constitutionalism and judicial supremacy as generative;
the fundamental constitutional beliefs of the American people are informed
and sustained by the constitutional law announced by courts, just as that
law is informed and sustained by the fundamental constitutional beliefs of
Americans. The stability and structure of constitutional law allows the
Constitution to assume coherent institutional embodiment and to fulfill the
value of democracy. The political commitments of the Constitution endow
constitutional law with democratic legitimacy and effective implementa-
tion.53
This delicate equilibrium would be disrupted if either the Constitution
or constitutional law were permitted wholly to dominate the other. To al-
low constitutional law to dictate the Constitution is to risk having the fun-
damental beliefs of the nation supplanted by the narrow professional reason
and organizational limitations of courts. 4 Yet to allow the political judg-
ment of the Constitution to dictate constitutional law is to risk undermining
the stability and reliability of the very constitutional rights that may ex-
press and protect values, including the value of democracy, that are con-
tained in the Constitution. Seen from this angle, the integrity of popular
constitutionalism would appear to depend upon the preservation of a proper
50. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 63; see also id. at 24 (citing source for the phrase "political-legal"
as 3 JOHN REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY TO
LEGISLATE 28-29 (1991)).
51. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 63. This frontier can also be conceptualized as lying between the
Constitution endowed with the authority of law and the Constitution endowed with the authority of
ethos. See Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, REPRESENTATIONS, Spring 1990, at
19-35.
52. Post & Siegel, supra note 6, at 20-21.
53. That is why Alexander Bickel has observed that "[v]irtually all important decisions of the
Supreme Court are the beginnings of conversations between the Court and the people and their
representatives." ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 91
(Yale Univ. Press 1978) (1970).
54. On the theoretical inadequacy of this approach, see Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
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balance between the Constitution and constitutional law. Maintaining this
balance entails different roles for courts and for nonjudicial actors.
Because courts are authorized to speak only as "instruments of the
law,"55 judges can ground constitutional law in the Constitution only by
incorporating the political convictions of the nation into the substance of
constitutional law. Courts routinely act in this way, however much they
may proclaim that constitutional law is independent from political cul-
ture.56 We join with Kramer in contesting recent decisions in which the
Rehnquist Court has asserted with increasing stridency that it alone must
remain "the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text,"57 especially those
decisions in which the Court has used this juricentric premise tightly to
circumscribe Congress's power to interpret the Constitution under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. But, unlike Kramer, we do not regard
the excesses of these decisions as a justification for repudiating the idea
that the Constitution has features of ordinary law; instead we believe that
these decisions are best criticized for their inadequate or mistaken view of
constitutional law. They articulate doctrinal rules that fail to strike a proper
balance between constitutional law and the Constitution.58
Nonjudicial actors, in contrast to courts, are not required to act only
according to law. This implies that if in particular circumstances there are
constitutional values at stake that are more important than the institution of
law, if "lives are at risk"59 or if the survival of the nation is threatened,6"
nonjudicial actors retain the option of acting in defiance of law, as for
example by refusing to comply with judicial judgments.6' Of course,
because the rule of law is "fundamental ' 62 and stands between us and "the
Hobbesian war of all against all," 63 such circumstances should be
exceedingly rare. This suggests that it would be a fundamental mistake to
define constitutional law in ways that force nonjudicial actors regularly to
choose between obeying constitutional law and fulfilling what they regard
as their constitutional obligations.
55. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824).
56. Post, supra note 13, at 76-77; Post & Siegel, supra note 13, at 1982-2032; Siegel, Text in
Context, supra note 13, at 314-16.
57. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000); see also KRAMER, supra note 1, at
225.
58. See Post & Siegel, supra note 13, at 1952-80, 2020-39.
59. Eisgruber, supra note 28, at 364.
60. See, e.g., Exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487); Paulsen, supra
note 30, at 88-99.
61. Michel Rosenfeld, Executive Autonomy, Judicial Authority and the Rule of Law: Reflections
on Constitutional Interpretation and the Separation of Powers, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 137, 167-68
(1993).
62. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).
63. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" As a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1997); see also Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 781, 788-89 (1989).
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If nonjudicial actors should comply with law except in the most ex-
ceptional of circumstances, it is a matter of some significance how we
draw the boundary between constitutional law and the Constitution. The
broader the reach of constitutional law, the more nonjudicial actors are
bound by the legal vision of courts, and the more diminished is the space
for the political creation of the Constitution. For this reason, the tension
between popular constitutionalism and judicial supremacy has historically
been played out in the shifting boundary between constitutional law and
the Constitution. An important dimension of this boundary is the question
of whether constitutional law subsists in the principles and reasons ad-
vanced in judicial opinions, or whether it is instead confined to the specific
holdings of judicial judgments.' 4
There is at present intense controversy on this question. Edward A.
Hartnett, for example, contends:
The distinction between judgments and opinions has important
ramifications for the duty of obedience. Parties to a case can
legitimately be expected to "obey" judgments. So, too, the
executive can legitimately be expected to "obey" a court order
(such as a writ of execution) calling on the executive to enforce
that judgment against the parties. But what does it mean to "obey"
an opinion? An opinion, as an explanation of reasons for a
judgment, does not direct that anything be done or not be done.
There is nothing in it that calls for obedience.
... Since actions premised on disagreement with judicial
opinions is commonplace, classifying such ordinary, routine
legislative and executive behavior as disobedient runs the serious
risk of regularizing and legitimizing all disobedience.
While a judicial opinion is not entitled to obedience, it is
entitled to deference. Those outside the judicial branch-in
particular, the President and members of Congress-should, as
President Lincoln counseled, give judicial opinions "very high
respect and consideration, in all paralel[l] cases."65
Others, like Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, believe that the rea-
soning of a judicial opinion carries the same force as a judicial judgment,
so that the rule of law requires that nonjudicial actors be bound by judicial
opinions in the same way as would a lower court.66
The stakes in this controversy are large. If constitutional law were
limited to the precise judgments of particular cases, constitutional law
64. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 31.
65. Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 123,
148, 154 (1999) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Lincoln's First Inaugural Address, in 4 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 268 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953)); see also David E. Engdahl,
John Marshall's "Jeffersonian" Concept of Judicial Review, 42 DUKE L.J. 279 (1992).
66. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 37.
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would threaten to collapse into a sequence of discrete pointillistic decrees
without intellectual coherence, integrity, or vision. Individuals would have
to litigate continuously to secure the benefits and protection of the law, and
constitutional law would become correspondingly impotent to achieve the
institutional purposes for which constitutional rights have been established.
But if constitutional law were to include all the logic and principles con-
tained in judicial opinions, constitutional law could easily expand to an all-
encompassing and seamless web of legal reasoning. Nonjudicial actors
would be able to disagree with the Court, or to engage the Court in dia-
logue, only on pain of disobeying the law itself.67 This tension is intractable
and insoluble: If constitutional law is defined too narrowly, it can become
unmoored from constitutional ideals and principles; if it is defined too
broadly, the technical legal reason of constitutional law will threaten to
suffocate the political dimensions of the Constitution.68
As nonjudicial actors strike the balance between these conflicting val-
ues, so they mark the boundaries of constitutional law. The practice of our
constitutional order reflects continuing dissensus about the nature of these
boundaries. The deference due to judicial opinions and judgments is
worked out, issue by issue, over time, with distinct points of equilibria
achieved and unsettled in substantive disputes over controverted questions
of constitutional governance. The practice of disturbing these uncertain and
unstable boundaries is in fact the practice of constitutional dialogue,
fraught precisely because of the multiple and inconsistent values that are in
play. The boundaries between the Constitution and constitutional law are
sustained by a complex negotiation between deference and disagreement,
between the comity69 necessary to instantiate a legal constitutional order
67. This is because the Supreme Court has advanced so many far-reaching and inclusive reasons
in its numerous constitutional opinions that it has articulated a virtual universe of law which, as a
practical matter, would encompass most situations in which nonjudicial actors might find themselves.
Nonjudicial actors would thus be situated within a world of articulated law from which almost no
circumstance would be excepted. We note, however, that it is not uncommon for Congress to test the
limits of judicial opinions in ways that would be quite improper if Congress were obligated to obey the
reasoning of the Supreme Court as it would the law itself. See, e.g., BURGESS, supra note 28; Louis
Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation By Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707 (1985).
68. The law faces a somewhat analogous dilemma in determining the extent to which courts can
implement legal decrees by binding the behavior of nonparties. In such circumstances courts balance
the value of "enforcing judgments" against the value of respecting the "freedom of action" of
nonparties. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 63 cmt. D (1982). Compare Alemite Mfg.
Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 832 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.) ("[N]o court can make a decree which will
bind any one but a party; ... it cannot lawfully enjoin the world at large, no matter how broadly it
words its decree.") with United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 1972) (Wisdom, J.) ("Courts
of equity have inherent jurisdiction to preserve their ability to render judgment .... ").
69. The Supreme Court declared in Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485 (1900),
that:
Comity is not a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience and expediency. It is something
more than mere courtesy, which implies only deference to the opinion of others, since it has a
substantial value in securing uniformity of decision, and discouraging repeated litigation of
the same question. But its obligation is not imperative. If it were, the indiscreet action of one
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and the autonomy necessary to give that order life and vibrancy.7" One way
to restate Kramer's essential point is that in recent years the boundaries of
constitutional law have been set far too expansively, so that they now need
substantial trimming.7'
V
THE MEANING OF POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
The American constitutional order subordinates constitutional law to
the Constitution. Through the appointment and confirmation process, as
well as through a variety of other mechanisms, the people in the end will
have the form of constitutional law that they deem fit. That is why our con-
stitutional law has evolved in history as the values and beliefs of the
American people have evolved.7 ' There is in fact no danger that popular
constitutionalism will be lost, in the sense that the people will relinquish
the ultimate right and authority to control the meaning of their
Constitution.
Kramer's point, however, is far more subtle. Although the people may
ultimately secure the Constitution that corresponds to their values, their
confidence in imagining and pursuing these values depends in no small
measure on the boundaries they ascribe to constitutional law. As Kramer
writes:
[W]hether I would actively oppose a decision or course of
decisions will depend on whether I think the decision or course of
decisions is legitimate; and my judgments about legitimacy turn
not only on whether I agree or disagree with the Court's rulings,
but also on whether I feel entitled to disagree and, more important
still, to act on my disagreement.73
Framed in this way, judicial supremacy is less a concept of jurisprudence
than of political theory. The danger of judicial supremacy is not that the
people will be deprived of the authority to decide a particular case, but
rather that they will cease to maintain a vibrant and energetic engagement
with the process of constitutional self-governance. Even if the people retain
court might become a precedent, increasing in weight with each successive adjudication, until
the whole country was tied down to an unsound principle. Comity persuades; but it does not
command. It declares not how a case shall be decided, but how it may with propriety be
decided.
Id. at 488; see also Lee v. Miller Cty., 800 F.2d 1372, 1375 (5th Cir. 1986) (Courts use "comity to
foster cooperation, promote harmony, and build goodwill.").
70. For examples of efforts to articulate the nature of this comity, see Dawn E. Johnsen,
Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
7 (2000); and David S. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDozo L. REV.
113 (1993).
71. See, e.g., supra note 31.
72. POWELL, supra note 33, at 6.
73. Kramer, supra note 2, at 974.
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the last word on the meaning of the Constitution, which they undoubtedly
will, they may nevertheless no longer feel "entitled to disagree" with the
opinions of the Court and hence lose the vital motivation and will for civic
participation.
We may thus interpret Kramer's call for popular constitutionalism as
sounding in the register of political virtue, rather than of legal rights.
Kramer's fundamental indictment is that as federal courts have expanded
and bureaucratized, and as the articulation of constitutional law has be-
come pervasive and routinized, the participation of the American people in
the formation of their Constitution has become correspondingly enervated
and attenuated.
This indictment rests on a set of complex and contestable empirical
claims. We know that the public and the Court understand the Constitution
in more court-centered ways than in the past, but do these changes reflect
an actual decline in popular engagement with the Constitution, as Kramer
seems to suggest, or instead do they express evolving forms of American
constitutional culture? If there has in fact been a decline, we must ask
whether judicial supremacy is the cause of this declension, or whether the
decline has been caused by other factors, as for example by a more general
loss of political involvement. Beliefs associated with judicial supremacy
may not necessarily contribute to public disengagement with constitutional
questions; in some circumstances they may actually inspire popular in-
volvement, as for example when citizens contesting same-sex marriage
mobilize to establish judicially enforceable constitutional rights or when
citizens mobilize to alter or amend judicial decisions involving abortion.
Kramer's work provocatively poses such questions. We agree with
Kramer that it is essential to sustain the political participation of the
American people in the formation of their Constitution, and we are in-
debted to him for illuminating the long and rich history of popular en-
gagement on which the American constitutional tradition rests. Kramer is
concerned about the many ways in which constitutional law can threaten
the Constitution. While we diverge from Kramer in our understanding of
the role that properly bounded constitutional rights can play in supporting
popular constitutional involvement, we join him in the view that constitu-
tional law can sometimes endanger a supremely precious tradition of po-
litical participation and self-governance. Kramer offers a vivid account of
this tradition, and we are grateful for his powerful call to maintain faith
with essential practices of our constitutional heritage.
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